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Operation 'Denucleunification': A
Proposal for the Reunification and
Denuclearization of the Korean
Peninsula
By EUNICE LEE*
I. Introduction
Questions regarding to the Korean peninsula have befuddled
the international community since the end of World War II, when
the region was arbitrarily divided by two emerging powers, the
Soviet Union and the United States. Since then, the peninsula has
remained in the public eye, largely as a result of North Korea's
nuclear program.
Scholars have addressed possible ways to
denuclearize the Korean peninsula, but to this day, North Korea
remains a nuclear state.' As North Korea remains isolated from the
outside world, mystery surrounds the manner in which its
government behaves. 2 Should the U.S. respond to North Korea's
perceived nuclear threat with force, 3 or should diplomacy be used to
achieve peace? Given the complexity of the nuclear dilemma, there
is no simple solution to resolve the nuclear threat.

* J.D. Candidate, 2010, University of California Hastings College of the Law;
B.A. in Political Science and Anthropology, University of California Berkeley, 2006.
I'd like to thank everyone who has helped me with this note, including the
wonderful HICLR staff and board.
1. North Korea is one of several non-NPT nuclear states, which are nuclear
states that are presently not parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.
2. For an article detailing the mystery surrounding North Korea's leader, Kim
Jong I1, see Zain Verjee, Mystery Surrounds Kim Jong II, CNN, Oct. 9, 2006,
http://edition.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/asiapcf/06/22/nkorea.kim/index.html.
3. For an explanation of the lack of justifications for a pre-emptive strike on
North Korea, see Brendan M. Howe & Jasper S. Kim, Legality, Legitimacy and
Justificationsfor Military Action Against North Korea, 11 U.C. DAVIS J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
229 (2005).
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Since its division, the Korean peninsula has been clouded by a
complex history. To understand how to resolve the nuclear threat, it
is crucial to recognize and account for the multi-layered factors
giving rise to the current predicament. Underneath North Korea's
nuclear threat lies the issue of peace and security on the Korean
peninsula. The issue of peace and security is not exclusively a
Korean issue, for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (hereinafter
"NPT") makes note in its Preamble that the "devastation that would
be visited upon all mankind by a nuclear war [mandates the]
consequent need to make every effort to avert the danger of such a
4
war and to take measures to safeguard the security of peoples."
North Korea had been a party to the NPT, but it withdrew in 2003
for reasons that will later be discussed. Nevertheless, as a member
of the U.N., North Korea must be committed to maintain
international peace and security and take "effective collective
measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the
peace.... "5 It is unclear whether peace and security will lead to
denuclearization, or whether denuclearization will produce peace
Nevertheless, the two issues are undoubtedly
and security.
interconnected. 6 With peace and security at stake, it is interesting
that reunification of the two Koreas has not played a prominent role
Without cordial relations
in discussions of denuclearization.
between the two halves of the Korean peninsula, there cannot be
peace and security. Thus, a dialogue on inter-Korean relations helps
to shed light on the motivations behind nuclear proliferation on the
Korean peninsula and is important to the pursuit of a unified,
denuclearized Korean peninsula.
4. Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons preamble, opened for
signatureJuly 1, 1968, 21 U.S.T. 483, 729 U.N.T.S. 161 [hereinafter NPT].
5. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1.
6. In fact, as the note will later discuss, agreements to end North Korea's
nuclear program have addressed peace and security on the Korean peninsula. For
instance, the Agreed Framework between the U.S. and North Korea stated that the
two countries would "work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula." Agreed Framework between the United States of America and
the Democratic People's Republic of Korea art. 3, U.S.-N. Korea, Oct. 21, 1994,
[hereinafter
available at http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/AgreedFramework.pdf
Agreed Framework]. Also, the Joint Statement produced from the Fourth Round of
Six Party Talks on September 19, 2005, agreed that the six parties (U.S., North
Korea, South Korea, China, Russia, and Japan) "committed to joint efforts for
lasting peace and stability in Northeast Asia." Joint Statement of the Fourth Round
of the Six-Party Talks, Sept. 19, 2005, availableat http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/
eng/zxxx/t212707.htm.
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With the multi-layered nature of North Korea's nuclear threat,
international efforts to denuclearize the peninsula have fallen short
of absolute denuclearization. This note strives to illustrate that
denuclearization and reunification of the Korean peninsula are not
mutually exclusive issues, and a potential way to bring peace and
security to the peninsula is to address both denuclearization and
reunification in an interconnected manner by means of a treaty
among the key players to the conflict - the U.S., North Korea, and
South Korea. To get there, Part II will lay the groundwork
explaining the historical motivations behind North Korea's nuclear
ambitions, including the role the U.S. played in provoking North
Korea to pursue a nuclear program. Part III will look more closely
at bilateral relations between the two Koreas and examine the
tumultuous relationship due to nuclearization, which has plagued
efforts to reunify the Korean peninsula. Part IV will explain how
the international community has attempted to resolve North Korea's
nuclear threat since 1993, in particular, through the use of the
Agreed Framework and the Six Party Talks.7
Part V will
demonstrate the shortcomings of both reunification and
denuclearization efforts through the Agreed Framework and Six
Party Talks, and will then present possible solutions to the issues at
hand, including a trilateral treaty among the U.S., North Korea, and
South Korea. Finally, Part VI will conclude with a look toward the
future of the Korean peninsula.
II. The Korean Peninsula's Modern History
A. Division of the Korean Peninsula
Near the end of World War II, the international community
divided the Korean peninsula along the thirty-eighth parallel line,
with Soviet troops in the North and U.S. troops occupying the
South.8 In 1947, the U.N. passed a resolution calling for the election
of a free and independent National Government of Korea.
However, a breakdown of relations between the U.S. and the Soviet

7. The Agreed Framework was an agreement whose objective was to freeze
North Korea's nuclear program. See infra Section IV.A. The Six Party Talks consist
of multilateral talks among six nations whose goal is to peacefully resolve security
concerns related to North Korea's nuclear program. See infra Section IV.B.
8. DON OBERDORFER, THE Two KOREAS: A CONTEMPORARY HISTORY 6-7 (2d ed.
2001).
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Union prevented the reunification of the two Koreas. 9 Thereafter,
the Soviet Union chose Kim I1 Sung to lead the North, while
Syngman Rhee was selected to head the South.1°
Increased tensions between the North and South led to North
Korea's invasion of the South on June 25, 1950. Kim I1Sung claimed
in a radio address that the invasion was intended to prevent
Syngman Rhee from turning "our country into a colony of [U.S.]
imperialism and make the entire Korean people slaves of [U.S.]
imperialism.""
However, North Korea failed to unify the
2
peninsula, as the U.S., South Korea, and other nations fought back.'
The Korean War ravaged the peninsula for the next three years,
firmly establishing the Cold War and bringing the Korean peninsula
to the center of global attention. 3 In 1953, an armistice stopped the
fighting and created a cease-fire line near the thirty-eighth parallel,
now known as the Korean Demilitarized Zone (hereinafter "DMZ"),
but the two Koreas never signed a peace treaty.1 4 Despite the
armistice, North and South Korea continued hostilities through
extensive espionage, occasional battles along the DMZ, and
propaganda aimed at the other side.1 5 The constant friction resulted
in a hardening of ideological and political lines, with hatred
between the regimes and blood feuds among family members
divided by the DMZ. 16 In hindsight, it is clear that the Korean War
contributed to the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula.

9. LouISE I. GERDES, NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA 14 (2007). See also G.A. Res. 112
(II), at 16 (Nov. 14, 1947).
10. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 8. Both leaders hoped to reunite the Korean
peninsula, with Kim II Sung having "a burning desire to reunite his country" and
Syngman Rhee believing that "he was destined to reunite Korea under an anticommunist banner." Id.
11. Kim II Sung: Go All Out For Victory in the War (radio address June 26, 1950),
http:/ /libweb.uoregon.edu/ec/e-asia/read/1006-j.pdf.
12. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 8.
13. Id. at 8-9.
14. GERDES, supra note 9, at 15.
15. JOHN FEFFER, NORTH KOREA SOUTH KOREA: U.S. POLICY AT A TIME OF CRISIS 46
(2003).
16. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 10. This has been one of the most important
consequences of the Korean War. Id.
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B. Nuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula
North Korea's decision to obtain a nuclear weapons arsenal did
not occur in a vacuum, but had roots in the Korean War. In 1952,
President Dwight Eisenhower had been elected in part on a
platform of ending the Korean War, and in February 1953 he turned
to the possibility of using nuclear weapons when China and North
Korea stalled at peace talks.' 7 When the armistice was finally signed
in July 1953, President Eisenhower asserted that the threat of nuclear
weapons induced the signatures. 18 Following the Korean War, the
U.S. continued to provoke North Korea by declaring nuclear
support for South Korea, even though the armistice banned the
introduction of new weapons. 19 Given these actions, in light of the
existing tension on the Korean peninsula, it should not come as a
surprise that North Korea's interest in obtaining nuclear weapons
increased as the Cold War intensified. In fact, the U.S. nuclear
presence in South Korea "may have played a decisive role in
stimulating North Korean leaders to embark upon their own nuclear
20
weapons program."
Various rationales explain why North Korea gained interest in
acquiring a nuclear weapons system. First, as previously noted, a
nuclear weapons program may have helped deter and
21
counterbalance the U.S. nuclear umbrella over South Korea.
Second, North Korea feared an emerging South Korean nuclear
weapons program, and may have wanted to preempt South Korean
superiority. 22 In economic terms, nuclear proliferation initially
appeared to be "a cheaper route to national security than an
indefinite conventional arms race with the South... [especially
since] the South's growth rates and margin of economic superiority

17. MICHAEL J. MAZARR, NORTH KOREA AND THE BOMB 15-16, (2d ed. 1997).
18. Id. at 16. Thus, according to Michael Mazarr, the U.S. had exposed North
Korea, in "its infancy as a nation, to the fearsome power and enormous political
value of nuclear weapons."
19. Id. at 20. In January 1955, the Chairman of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff,
Admiral Arthur W. Radford, explicitly pledged to South Korea that the U.S. would
secure Seoul through nuclear systems. Id.
20. Id. at 17.
21. This can be seen as a reactionary response rather than aggressive action,
since North Korea probably believed their lack of security to be a "potentially fatal
weakness" in light of U.S. nuclear capabilities. Id.
22. Id. at 18.
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began to soar in the 1970s."23 Moreover, North Korea may have
desired an end to the inter-Korean rivalry by breaking up the South
Korean government and uniting the country on North Korea's
terms, which "would certainly resolve North Korea's main security
problem." 24 Third, the North Korean regime may have viewed the
possession of nuclear weapons as a means of gaining diplomatic
leverage, perhaps to "extract economic concessions in negotiations"
with the international community.25 Fourth, possession of nuclear
weapons would have provided North Korea with the military
26
resources to reduce its dependence on its allies, China and Russia.
This desire for security independence likely increased as relations
between China and the Soviet Union soured during the Cold War.
After a relatively calm period in the late 1950s, North Korea's
27
perception of threats to its existence reemerged in the 1960s.
Despite its security alliances with China and the Soviet Union,
North Korea had been dissatisfied with its allies on various
occasions since the Korean War.28 During the Cuban Missile Crisis,
North Korean officials worried that the Soviet Union's acquiescence
to U.S. demands and abandonment of Fidel Castro's regime
forecasted a similar response if North Korea were to confront the
U.S.29 In light of the U.S. nuclear threat to North Korea, as well as
North Korea's precarious position in Sino-Soviet tensions, North
30
Korea's "embryonic nuclear program slowly took shape."
23. SELIG S. HARRISON, KOREAN ENDGAME: A STRATEGY FOR REUNIFICATION AND
U.S. DISENGAGEMENT 203 (2002).
24. Daniel A. Pinkston, North Korean Motivationsfor Developing Nuclear Weapons,
http://cns.miis.edu/north-korea/dprkmotv.pdf.
25. Benjamin Friedman, Fact Sheet: North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program,
CENTER FOR DEFENSE INFORMATION, Jan. 23, 2003, http://www.cdi.org/nuclear/nkfact-sheet.cfm. Given that North Korea was a relatively young state, possessing
nuclear weapons might have forced the world to take notice of the country and take
it seriously in international relations.

26.

MAZARR,

supra note 17, at 19.

27. Id. at 22-23.
28. For example, even though China and the Soviet Union aided North Korea
during the Korean War, Kim I1Sung desired more support than he received. He
wanted more Soviet ground forces to expel the Americans from Korea, but Stalin
did not meet Kim's demands. Pinkston, supra note 24.
29. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 23. Meanwhile, South Korea had been moving
rapidly ahead in developing a modem army with the Americans' aid, so North
Korea announced that it would "henceforth place 'equal emphasis' on military
preparedness and economic development." Id.
30. Id. at 24.
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In the early 1960s, North Korea turned to China shortly after the
large neighbor had detonated its first atomic blast. Reportedly
Chinese leaders declined the request to share nuclear knowledge,
dismissive as they were of North Korea as a small country. 31 Then
in 1965, the Soviet Union provided a small two-to-four megawatt
Soviet research reactor and a .1 megawatt nuclear research lab at
Yongbyon.32 By the 1980s, North Korea "perceived itself to be
standing alone, trapped between the Sino-Soviet conflict to the
north, the Sino-American alignment to the west and Japan to the
east, and over half a million hostile soldiers to the south."33
Sometime in the mid-1980s, the international community began to
take notice of the nuclear activity at Yongbyon. A U.S. intelligence
satellite discovered evidence of the construction of a second nuclear
reactor at Yongbyon that was large enough to produce one bomb's
worth of plutonium each year.34 The U.S. then turned to the Soviet
Union for assistance on the North Korean nuclear issue. To
encourage North Korea to sign the NPT, the Soviet Union agreed to
supply four light-water nuclear power reactors if North Korea
joined the NPT. North Korea agreed, promising "not to receive or
manufacture nuclear weapons and to accept international inspection
of all its nuclear facilities to verify that weapons were not being
35
produced."
At various times during the 1980s, North Korea had called for a
nuclear-free peninsula, but developments in the 1990s tested North

OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 252-53.
32. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 25. Also, in the late 1960s South Korea had
motive to acquire nuclear weapons, as the U.S. security commitment began to fade.
Id. at 27. In turn, North Korea responded in several ways: it moved to reaffirm ties
with and obtain new security pledges from traditional allies; it publicly denounced
the importance of nuclear weapons and claimed an ability to defend itself
comfortably without them; it expanded its formal commitment to nonproliferation;
and it continued to work on its own nuclear weapons program, beginning work on
the large reactor at Yongbyon that would eventually cause much concern in the
1980s and 1990s. Id. at 28.
33. Id. at 32.
34. Id. at 40. The U.S., paying close attention to the developments at Yongbyon,
asked the Soviet Union to convince North Korea to sign the NPT, "hoping this
would lead to international inspection and control of Pyongyang's nuclear
facilities." OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 254.
35. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 254. This commitment would later serve as the
legal justification for international intervention to stop North Korea's nuclear
program. Id.

31.
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[33.1

Korea's seriousness about denuclearization.36
The fall of
communism in Eastern Europe in 1989 and the fall of the Soviet
Union in 1991 resulted in a significant drop in aid to North Korea,
leading to decreased relations with Russia and a loss of the security
guarantees that North Korea had maintained since the Korean
War. 37 With knowledge of North Korean activity at Yongbyon, the
U.S. pursued a strategy whereby North Korea's compliance with the
NPT would lead to progress in other areas, such as the
normalization of relations. To do so, the U.S. and South Korea
began a nonproliferation campaign directed at North Korea, which
included U.S. nuclear withdrawal from South Korea and potential
reconsideration of the U.S.-South Korean Team Spirit military
exercises if "progress were made on the nuclear issue." 38
In February 1992, it appeared that progress was made, with
North Korea agreeing to sign an agreement with the International
Atomic Energy Agency (hereinafter "IAEA") in which the IAEA
would have the right to ensure that safeguards were applied to the
peaceful use of nuclear facilities.3 9 In May 1992, North Korea
allowed a team from the IAEA to inspect the facility at Yongbyon
for the first time, but by the end of 1992, it became apparent that
North Korea had provided an inaccurate accounting of the true
nature of its nuclear activities. 40 The IAEA then demanded an
36. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 41. In 1980, Kim I1Sung explained at the Sixth
KWP Congress that North Korea wanted a nuclear-free peninsula, and by 1986,
extended this request to include tripartite talks with the U.S. and South Korea. Id.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, North Korea wanted U.S. nuclear forces
withdrawn from South Korea and hoped to establish a general agreement for a
nuclear-free zone in Korea. Id. North Korea has maintained that the U.S. provoked
the nuclearization of the Korean peninsula despite North Korea's objections. See
Charles J. Moxley, Jr., The Sword in the Mirror: The Lawfulness of North Korea's Use and
Threat of Use of Nuclear Weapons based on the United States' Legitimization of Nuclear
Weapons, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1379, 1411-12 (April 2004).
37. U.S. Department of State, North Korea (08/08), http://www.state.gov
/r/pa/ei/bgn/2792.htm (2009). Moreover, South Korea established diplomatic
relations with the Soviet Union in 1990 and with the China in 1992, which further
strained relations between North Korea and its allies.
38. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 51, 59, 67.
39. Int'l Atomic Energy Agency [IAEA], Agreement of 30 January1992 between the
Government of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the International Atomic
Energy Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the
Non-Proliferationof Nuclear Weapons, art. 1, IAEA Doc. INFCIRC/403 (Jan. 30, 1992),
availableat http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/inf4O3.
shtml.
40. MAZARR, supra note 18, at 79-94. During Blix's inspection, he had suspected
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unprecedented inspection of nuclear sites not offered voluntarily by
North Korea, and in response, the North Korean newspaper Nodong
Sinmun warned that the IAEA was attempting to infringe on North
Korea's sovereignty. 41 North Korea then stunned the world in
42
March 1993 when it announced its intention to abandon the NPT.
The U.S. agreed to high-level talks after North Korea announced its
withdrawal. After eighty-nine days of intense negotiations, North
Korea agreed to temporarily suspend its withdrawal only for as
long as it considered the country to be safe from harm. 43 For the
time being, a tense situation was eased, but the conflict was far from
over.
III. Reunification Efforts on the Korean Peninsula
The 1993 endeavor by the U.S. to stop North Korea's
withdrawal from the NPT was vital for containing North Korea's
nuclear threat. Moreover, the effort to halt North Korea's nuclear
program has been important because it "holds explosive
implications for the evolution of the Korean peninsula and the
architecture of regional security." 44 However, denuclearization of
the Korean peninsula cannot be addressed without discussing
reunification efforts on the Korean peninsula as well. While much
of the global community focused primarily on the issue of North
Korea's nuclear weapons program during the latter half of the
twentieth century, North and South Korea had been engaged in
discussions of possible reunification since the 1970s. 45 To fully
realize the possibility of resolving North Korea's nuclear threat and
attaining peace and security, it is helpful to understand the history
that North Korea was engaged in plutonium reprocessing, contrary to its earlier
claims. Id. at 83.
41. Id. at 96, 99.
42. David. E. Sanger, North Korea, Fighting Inspection, Renounces Nuclear Arms
Treaty, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 12, 1993, available at http://www.query.nytimes
.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9FOCEFDC103EF931A25750COA965958260&sec=&spo
n=&partner=permalink&exprod=permalink.
43. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 121. Meanwhile, the U.S. "offered only the
slimmest carrot: a pledge not to 'use armed forces, including nuclear weapons, nor
threaten' such use against the North .. " Id.
44. Id. at 9.
45. See SAMUEL S. KIM, NORTH KOREA FOREIGN RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR
WORLD
71-77 (Strategic Studies Institute, April 2007),
http://www.

strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles/PUB772.pdf
relations following the Korean War).

(discussing inter-Korean
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of dialogue between North and South Korea with regards to
reunification and denuclearization.
Following the armistice, both North and South Korea talked
superficially about eventual reunification, but during the 1950s and
1960s, the countries mainly exhibited animosity towards each
another. 46 However, Red Cross talks in the 1970s resulted in a joint
agreement with three principles: (1) unification achieved through
independent efforts; (2) unification achieved through peaceful
means; and (3) national unity sought by transcending differences in
ideas, ideologies, and systems. 47 The euphoria was brief as failed
talks to co-host the 1988 Seoul Olympics were followed by the 1987
Korean Air Flight 858 bombing by North Korean secret agents. 48
South Korea then began pursuing the Nordpolitik policy in the late
1980s, hoping to pressure North Korea to reduce tensions by
normalizing relations with North Korea's traditional allies. North
Korea reacted to this coolly, accusing South Korea of "intend[ing] to
49
permanently split the country."
In a 1988 speech to the U.N. General Assembly, South Korean
President Roh called for a wide-ranging discussion of issues
concerning peace and stability in Northeast Asia and proposed to
replace the 1953 armistice agreement with a peace treaty.5 0 The talks
that stemmed from Roh's proposal resulted in two agreements: the
Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression, Exchanges, and
Cooperation (hereinafter "Basic Agreement"), and the Declaration
on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (hereinafter "Joint
Declaration").5 l
The Joint Declaration was an important step

46. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 11.

47. Kim, supra note 45, at 71. However, these initial contacts broke down in
1973 and there was no other significant contact until the early 1980s. U.S.
Department of State, supra note 37. Talks renewed in 1984 when South Korea
accepted North Korea's offer to provide relief goods to flood victims in South
Korea. FEFFER, supra note 15, at 48.
48. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 180-86.
49. Id. at 188-89.
50. South Korea Foreign Policy, Basic Goals and Accomplishments,
http://countrystudies.us/south-korea/75.htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009). See also
Paul Lewis, South Korean Chief at U.N., Calls For World Talks and Unification, N.Y.
TIMES, Oct. 19, 1988, at Al, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/
fullpage.html?res=940DEEDD113FF93AA25753CIA96E948260&sec=&spon=&page
wanted=all.
51. See Agreement on Reconciliation, Non-aggression and Exchanges and
Cooperation Between the South and the North, N. Korea-S. Korea, Dec, 13, 1991,
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towards inter-Korean cooperation. It stated that North and South
Korea "shall not test, manufacture, produce, receive, possess, store,
deploy or use nuclear weapons," "shall use nuclear energy solely for
peaceful purposes," "shall not possess nuclear reprocessing and
uranium enrichment facilities," and that to implement the Joint
Declaration, "[the Koreas] shall establish and operate a South-North
Joint Nuclear Control Commission (hereinafter "JNCC")."5 2 Around
the same time as the Joint Declaration came into force in February
53
1992, North Korea signed the IAEA Safeguards Agreement.
Subsequently, the JNCC was established in March 1992 to help
implement the Joint Declaration, but the two countries made little
progress toward establishing an inspection regime, and dialogue
eventually stalled as "it gradually became apparent that the North
was unwilling to approve a plan for meaningful challenge
inspections."54
North Korea essentially disregarded the Joint Declaration,
which prohibited the possession of nuclear reprocessing and
uranium enrichment facilities, and refused IAEA inspections, thus
"[raising] tensions in Korea to the boiling point." 55 For various
reasons, including lack of progress on implementation of the Joint
Declaration and the IAEA's unprecedented inspection demand,
North Korea threatened to withdraw from the NPT in 1993. The
threat to withdraw brought inter-Korean dialogue to an abrupt halt,
and tensions ran high on the Korean peninsula as the confrontation

available at http://www.nautilus.org/DPRKBriefingBook/agreements/CanKorVTK-1991-12-13-agreement-on-reconciliation-non-agression-exchanges.pdf
[hereinafter Basic Agreement]; Joint Declaration on the Denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, N.Korea-S. Korea, Jan. 20, 1992, availableat http://www.fas.org/
news/dprk/1992/920219-D4129.htm [hereinafter Joint Declaration].
52. Joint Declaration, supra note 51.
53. See supra Part II.B.
54. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 86. Predictably, the nuclear crisis generated
nationalistic concerns in South Korea regarding the problem of reunification. Id. at
10. South-North dialogue on the issue of reunification continued to delay, thus
preventing South Korean businesses from building an economic infrastructure, a
unification safety net, in the North. Id. Further, many South Koreans especially
objected to their government's promise not to develop nuclear reprocessing
facilities per U.S. request. Id. See generally Federation of American Scientists,
Nuclear Weapons Program - North Korea, http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide/
dprk/nuke/index.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2009).
55. Id. at 97; Joint Declaration, supra note 51 ("South and North Korea shall not
possess nuclear reprocessing and uranium enrichment facilities.").
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between North Korea and the global community worsened.5 6 South
Korea began to view the North from a tougher stance, and in the
early 1990s, it appeared as though the nuclear crisis would prevent
reunification of the Korean peninsula. 57 With a dangerous situation
worsening, the U.S. stepped in to convince North Korea not to
withdraw from the NPT, which the next section will highlight.
Since then, the international community has taken steps to resolve
the North Korean nuclear threat through a series of agreements and
talks.
IV. International Efforts to Address
North Korea's Nuclear Threat
A.

Geneva Agreed Framework

As the 1990s progressed, concern over North Korea's nuclear
program became a major issue in international relations. With
North Korea's pending withdrawal from the NPT, the U.N. Security
Council passed Resolution 825 in May 1993 urging North Korea to
re-affirm its obligations under the NPT and to comply with the
IAEA Safeguards Agreement in addition to asking Member States to
encourage North Korea to respond positively to the resolution. 58
The U.S. responded by holding talks with North Korea in June 1993,
outlining basic principles for continued U.S.-North Korean dialogue
and North Korea suspending withdrawal from the NPT. 59 The U.S.
and North Korea finally agreed to the Agreed Framework in
October 1994.60 Under the agreement, North Korea agreed to:
freeze activity at its existing reactor and at the reprocessing site
within one month of signing the framework and promise not to
construct any new graphite reactors or reprocessing facilities ...

56. See OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 281-304.
57. For example, South Korea decided to go ahead with planning for the U.S.South Korean Team Spirit Exercise in 1993, which was very risky in light of
negotiations. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 88. The North Korean Foreign Ministry
issued a statement saying that the Team Spirit exercise was a "criminal act" that
would "drive North-South dialogue to a crisis" and "cast dark shadows on U.S.[North Korean] relations," which had been improving until then. Id. at 92.
58. S.C. Res. 825,
1, 2, 4, U.N. Doc. S/RES/825 (May 11, 1993).
59. Globalsecurity.org, Nuclear Weapons Program - North Korea: 1994 Agreed
Framework,
http://www.globalsecurity.org/wmd/world/dprk/nukeagreedframework. htm (last visited Feb. 16, 2009.)
60. MAZARR, supranote 17, at 173.
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and permit regular nuclear inspections as provided by the terms
of the [NPT] that would be performed by the IAEA under a
special mandate Washington promised to work out with the
[U.N.].61
In exchange, North Korea would receive assurance that the U.S.
would not use nuclear weapons against it, fuel oil, economic
cooperation and two modern light-water nuclear power plants by a
target date of 2003, to be supplied and financed by the Korean
Peninsula
Energy
Development
Organization
(hereinafter
"KEDO").6 2 North Korea's existing nuclear facilities were to be
completely dismantled by the time the light-water reactor project
was complete, and in the meantime, North Korea agreed to freeze its
reactors and allow IAEA inspectors to monitor the freeze. 63
Additionally, KEDO would:
provide for the supply of interim energy alternatives in lieu of the
energy from [North Korea's] graphite-moderated reactors
pending construction of the first light-water reactor... [and]
provide for the implementation of any other measures deemed
necessary to... carry out the objectives of the Agreed
Framework. 64
However, problems with KEDO caused persistent "delays in
negotiating critical agreements relating to specific aspects of the
construction process and eventual operation of the reactors." 65
Over the years, North Korea became increasingly frustrated
with U.S. failures to adhere to the Agreed Framework. U.S.-North
Korean tensions intensified when President Bush, in his 2002 State
of the Union address, categorized North Korea as part of the "Axis
of Evil," calling it a "regime arming with missiles and weapons of
mass destruction, while starving its citizens." 66 Later that year, the
U.S. claimed that North Korea was developing an uranium

61. Id.
62. Id. at 173-75.
OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 357.
64. Agreement on the Establishment of the Korean Peninsula Energy
Development Organization, U.S.-Japan-S. Korea, art. 2(a)(2)-(3), Mar. 9, 1995,
http://www.kedo.org/pdfs/EstablishmentKEDO.pdf.
65. Harrison, supra note 23, at 260.
66. George W. Bush, President of the United States, State of the Union Address
(Jan. 29, 2002) (transcript available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/
ALLPOLITICS/01/29/bush.speech.txt/).

63.
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enrichment program for nuclear weapons purposes. 67 Assistant
Secretary of State James Kelly visited North Korea to question
officials about North Korea's secret program to enrich uranium, and
the regime did not rebut the allegations. 68 Such a program would
presumably violate North Korea's obligations under the NPT, the
IAEA Agreement, the Joint Declaration, and the Agreed Framework
- all of the agreements that North Korea had entered with regards to
denuclearization. Whether North Korea affirmatively admitted to a
secret program or not, the U.S. subsequently announced that the
69
Agreed Framework was obsolete.
Subsequently, North Korea pulled out of the NPT in January
2003, justifying its decision as a "legitimate self-defense measure." 70
North Korea declared that if the U.S. dropped its "hostile policy to
stifle North Korea," then it would prove through separate
verification with the U.S. that it was not constructing a nuclear
weapon. 71 Under Article X(1) of the NPT, a State has "the right to
withdraw from the Treaty if it decides that extraordinary events,
related to the subject matter of [the NPT], have jeopardized the
supreme interests of its country." 72 In its withdrawal statements,
North Korea accused the U.S. of violating international law,
rationalizing that "[by] listing [North Korea] as a target for [...]
nuclear preemptive attack, the Bush administration completely
destroyed the basis of the Agreed Framework. As such, it flagrantly
infringed on the basic spirit of the NPT." 73 Afterwards, North Korea
moved to terminate IAEA monitoring at Yongbyon, began
reprocessing the existing spent fuel, and expelled U.N. inspectors,
all due to the U.S.' "hostile policy." 74 With the Agreed Framework
defunct and North Korea pulling out of the NPT, the international

67. FEFFER, supra note 15, at 11.
68. Id. at 65.
69. Id. Predictably, North Korea responded to the Bush administration's
abrasive approach with severity, not only ending negotiations with the U.S., but
also breaking off ongoing efforts to reconcile with South Korea. Id.
70. N. Korea Says Withdrawing From Nuclear Treaty is 'Self Defense', CNN, Jan. 11,
2003, http:/ /www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/asiapcf/east/01/11/nkorea.rally/.
71. Id.
72. NPT, supra note 4, art. X(1).
73. KCNA 'Detailed Report' Explains NPT Withdrawal, KOREAN CENTRAL NEWS
AGENCY, Jan. 22, 2003 (translation available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/guide
/ dprk/ nuke/ dprk012203.html).
74. U.S. Department of State, supra note 37.
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community responded
catastrophe.

rapidly with the hope of avoiding a

B. Six Party Talks
In early 2003, the U.S. proposed multilateral talks regarding the
North Korean nuclear threat, which North Korea initially opposed. 75
However, with China's involvement, North Korea agreed to talks
with the U.S. and China in April 2003.76 In August 2003, the Six
Party Talks commenced as a multilateral approach to end North
Korea's nuclear program, with North Korea, South Korea, the U.S.,
China, Russia, and Japan participating. 77 During the talks, North
Korea agreed to eliminate its nuclear program if the U.S. signed a
bilateral "non-aggression treaty," but the U.S. declined North
Korea's proposal. 78 The first few meetings made no apparent
progress, but the fourth meeting in mid-2005 resulted in a presumed
understanding that North Korea was entitled to have a peaceful
nuclear program. 79 However, conflicting reports existed as to the
meaning of a peaceful program. The U.S. asserted that full
disarmament had to be a first step before it would consider North
Korea's request for a light-water reactor, while North Korea said
that the light-water reactors must be agreed to before any
disarmament was to begin.8 0
Meanwhile, North Korea was moving forward with its nuclear
program, and in 2006 there was strong evidence that North Korea

75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Jayshree Bajoria & Carin Zissis, Backgrounder, The Six-Party Talks on North

Korea's Nuclear Program,

COUNCIL

ON

FOREIGN

RELATIONS,

July 1,

2009,

http://www.cfr.org/publication/13593/.
78. U.S. Department of State, supra note 37.
79. William J. Perry, Former Sec'y of Defense under President Bill Clinton,
Testimony to the House Foreign Affairs Committee (Jan. 18, 2007) (transcript
available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/congress/2007_hr/
070118-perry.htm). Discussions in mid-2005 resulted in all parties agreeing to a
Joint Statement of Principles. U.S. Department of State, supra note 38. The parties
unanimously reaffirmed the goal of verifiable peaceful denuclearization of the
Korean Peninsula, North Korea committed to abandon all nuclear weapons and
existing nuclear programs and to return to the NPT and to IAEA safeguards, the
other parties agreed to provide economic cooperation and energy assistance, and
the U.S and North Korea agreed to take steps to normalize relations subject to
bilateral policies. Id.
80. Perry, supra note 80.
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was well on its way to build a sizable nuclear arsenal.8 1 In October
2006, North Korea conducted a nuclear bomb test, which the U.N.
Security Council strongly condemned, calling for North Korea to
return to multilateral talks.8 2 A breakthrough came in the February
2007 agreement in the Six Party Talks, which not only highlighted a
path toward a denuclearized Korean peninsula, but also outlined
steps toward the normalization of political relations with North
Korea. The breakthrough led to the U.S. eventually removing North
Korea from the state-sponsor-of-terrorism list and ending the
application of the Trading with the Enemy Act, a replacement of the
Korean War armistice with "a permanent peace regime on the
Korean Peninsula," and the building of "lasting peace and stability
83
in Northeast Asia."
The multilateral talks appeared to make progress, and in June
2008 the U.S. agreed to start lifting restrictions after North Korea
began the disarming process. 84 However, after several months of
cooperation, North Korea stopped disabling Yongbyon in August
2008 to protest the U.S.'s refusal to remove North Korea from the list
of state sponsors of terrorism. 8 5 The parties moved forward in
October 2008 when the U.S. and North Korea secured an agreement
in which North Korea would continue disarming its nuclear
program and allow U.S. inspectors access to its main declared
81. Id.
82. S.C. Res. 1718,
1, 14, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1718 (Oct. 14, 2006).
83. Agreement on Initial Actions for the Implementation of the Joint Statement,
art. II, 3; VI, Feb. 13, 2007, http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/eng/zxxx/t297463.htm.
84. U.S. to Ease North Korea Sanctions, BBC NEWS, June 26, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/7476625.stm. President Bush announced
that he would remove North Korea from the list of state sponsors of terrorism after
North Korea's programs were verified. Id. Shortly thereafter, North Korean
officials released video of the demolition of the cooling tower at Yongbyon,
considered symbolic of their commitment to ending their nuclear program. N.
Korea Demolishes Reactor Tower, BBC NEWS, June 27, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/
2/hi/asia-pacific/7476755.stm.
85. Officials: North Korean Nuclear Mission for United States Envoy, DAILY NEWS,
Sept. 28, 2008, http://www.nydailynews.com/news/us-world/2008/09/27/200809-27 officialsnorthkoreannuclearmissionf-3.html?print=l&page=all.
President Bush delayed the scheduled removal in August because North Korea had
refused to agree on a verification plan. North Korea Rebooting Nuclear Plants? United
States Chastens Country, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Sept. 24, 2008, http://www.
nydailynews.com/news/us-world/2008/09/24/2008-0924_northkorearebooting-nuclear-plants.uni.htnl.
In September 2008, North
Korea barred UN nuclear inspectors from its main nuclear reactor and planned to
reactivate the plant that supplied the plutonium for its nuclear bomb test. Id.
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nuclear compound at Yongbyon, in exchange for removal from the
U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism. 86 Yet, the parties ran into
problems in November 2008. The U.S. alleged that North Korea had
agreed to provide full access to its nuclear facilities and allow
inspectors to "take samples and conduct forensic tests." 87 North
Korea said that it never agreed to such a move, thus causing
ongoing negotiations to halt.88 Problems of interpretation, such as
the case with nuclear sampling, have hindered discussions of
denuclearization. As 2008 winded down, the parties remained at
odds over the scope of agreements, and despite over six years of the
Six Party Talks, the Korean peninsula still lacks peace and security.

V. Resolving the Issues of Reunification and
Denuclearization
Before the international community can denuclearize and bring
peace to the Korean peninsula, it is important to recall the historical
context in which North Korea decided to pursue a nuclear weapons
program. Given the historical roots previously outlined, various
scholars have asserted their belief that North Korea's nuclear
program is defensive rather than offensive. 89 As long as North
Korea feels threatened by the U.S., South Korea, or otherwise, it will
maintain a nuclear program.90 This posture, in turn, will inhibit

86. Helene Cooper, North Korea is Off Terror List After Deal with U.S., N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 12, 2008, at Al, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/12
/world/asia/12terror.html?_r=2.
87. N. Korea Rejects Nuclear Sampling, BBC NEWS, Nov. 12, 2008,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7724784.stm.
88. Id.
89. Peter Hayes illustrates that while the U.S. nuclear presence on the Korean
peninsula served only to deter a conventional attack from North Korea, it had the
effect of over-deterring North Korea. Harrison, supra note 23, at 198. This may
have contributed, either indirectly or directly, to North Korea's desire to build up a
nuclear arms arsenal in order to curb a U.S. nuclear attack. Also, David Kang
believes that North Korea has pursued a policy of "regime survival" because it
"believes it is facing a massive security threat from overwhelming U.S. might."
ANDREW SCOBELL, NORTH KOREA'S STRATEGIC INTENTIONS 4-5 (Strategic Studies
Institute, July 2005),
http://www.strategicstudiesinstitute.army.mil/pdffiles
/PUB611.pdf.
90. Andrew Scobell writes:
While leaders of communist countries tend to be prone to paranoia in the
first place, the Pyongyang regime also believes that it faces a very real
threat from the armed forces of the United States and [South Korea]. They
appear truly afraid of possible attack. This fear may have heightened in the
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peaceful relations on the Korean peninsula and weaken prospects
for reunification.
Some scholars believe that reunification is unlikely. 91
Resolution of the North Korean nuclear threat would require peace
on the peninsula, which involves reunification efforts. In essence,
absent good relations between the North and South, North Korea
will not disarm, and without denuclearization, the North and South
will continue to experience tense relations. This unstable situation
may be addressed by marrying efforts to reunite and denuclearize
the Korean peninsula. An official end to the Korean War provides a
symbolic and tangible step towards peace and security. When
coupled with denuclearization, the important players - North
Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. - can work together towards a
permanent regime that will establish peace and security on the
Korean peninsula.
A.

Why InternationalEfforts Have FailedThus Far
As illustrated by the previous sections, resolving North Korea's
nuclear threat has not been a simple task. Pestered by uncertainties
and broken promises, efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula
have stalled, and the two countries have not been able to establish a
permanent peace regime. On one hand, North Korea may feel so
threatened by external forces that it may be unwilling to give up its
nuclear program for security reasons, or perhaps it may be willing
to negotiate an end to its nuclear program only in exchange for the
guarantee of security and sovereignty. 92 On the other hand, it is
possible that North Korea's "key strategic goals are to build up its
WMD programs, engage in parasitic extortionism and pursue

spring of 2003 when U.S. and coalition forces toppled the regime of
Saddam Hussein in Iraq because North Korea feared that it might be the
next object of an American military operation.
SCOBELL, Id. at 8. For a discussion of North Korea's position as to the lawfulness of
its nuclear program, see also Moxley, supra note 36.
91. Bruce Cummings appears to suggest that "Pyongyang has given up on
unification and desires 'peaceful coexistence with the South."' SCOBELL, supra note
89, at 5. Stephen Bradner, a hawkish observer of North Korea, "argues that
Pyongyang 'will not reconcile with the South' but rather is intent on overthrowing
the Seoul government." Id. at 8.
92. Phillip C. Saunders, Confronting Ambiguity: How to Handle North Korea's
Nuclear Program, ARMS CONTROL ASS'N, Mar. 2003, http://www.armscontrol.org
/act/2003_03/saunders-mar03.
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unification by force or coercion." 93 The uncertainty of North Korea's
true nuclear intentions has been one of the contributing factors to
the international community's inability to ensure peace and security
on the Korean peninsula.
1. Agreed Framework
One reason why the Agreed Framework failed was due to the
sloppy character of the bilateral agreement. From the beginning, the
agreement lacked a sound structure, for it "did not address North
Korea's disintegrating power grid;... did not allay North Korea's
security concerns;... [and] did not obligate North Korea to reveal
until much later how much plutonium it reprocessed before the
freeze went into effect." 94 Moreover, the Agreed Framework
contained vague statements lacking a thorough implementation
plan. Ambiguous provisions in the Agreed Framework included,
for example, that "both sides will reduce barriers to trade and
investment," work together for peace and security on a nuclear-free
Korean peninsula," and "engage in North-South dialogue as this
Agreed Framework will help create an atmosphere that promotes
such dialogue." 95 As no specific criteria were set to implement these
ambiguous provisions, the absence of tangible steps may have
contributed to the collapse of the agreement. 96
Moreover, the Agreed Framework was not a treaty, so it did not
require Senate approval to come into force. 97 Under Article II of the
U.S. Constitution, the executive branch has the "power, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, to make treaties, provided two
thirds of the Senators present concur." 98 Since treaties require
approval by the Senate, it may have been more difficult to obtain the
requisite approval from the Senate for the Agreed Framework.

93. SCOBELL, supra note 89, at 27.
94. FEFFER, supra note 15, at 63.
95. See Agreed Framework, supra note 6, arts. 3-4.
96. Daniel A. Pinkston, JAMES MARTIN CTR. FOR
IMPLEMENTING THE AGREED FRAMEWORK

NONPROLIFERATION STUDIES,
AND POTENTIAL OBSTACLES (Oct. 2000),

http://cns.miis.edu/reports/kaeri.htm.
97. LEON V. SIGAL, DISARMING STRANGERS: NUCLEAR DIPLOMACY WITH NORTH
KOREA 190 (1998). For an interesting analysis of KEDO's Supply Agreement as
binding not as a treaty, but under customary international law, see Paul E.Boehm,
Decennial Deja Vu: Reassessing a Nuclear North Korea on the 1995 Supply Agreement's
Ten-Year Anniversary, 14 TUL. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 81, 106-08 (Winter 2005).
98. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
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However, the executive branch has devised ways to bypass the
Senate approval process for international agreements, most notably
through executive agreements. 99 In U.S. courts, the Supreme Court
has honored presidential executive agreements as being on the same
plane as Article II treaties. 0 0 However, the Agreed Framework has
not even been considered a binding executive agreement, which
raises issues regarding enforceability under international law, for
while the U.S. did not view the Agreed Framework as a binding
agreement, North Korea did.101 For purposes of international law,
agreements between two countries may be treated as binding,
governed by the provisions of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties (hereinafter "Vienna Convention").102
However, the
different standards that the U.S. and North Korea applied to the
Agreed Framework may have strained their ability to implement it
effectively. The U.S. General Accounting Office viewed the Agreed
Framework as "a nonbinding political agreement" or "nonbinding
international agreement," but North Korea thought the signed
agreement would be viewed as a legally binding treaty, and "has
since perceived itself as suffering from a double standard of
expectations regarding implementation."103
Given uncertainty
regarding the enforceability of the Agreed Framework, the
agreement crumbled when problems of interpretation and
implementation arose.
Another reason for the Agreed Framework's failure is that
South Korea had not been involved in the negotiation process1 04
Without intending to, the bilateral agreement between North Korea
and the U.S. alienated South Korea from discussions of the nuclear
threat, even though the Agreed Framework called for North Korea

99. See, e.g., General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A3,
55 U.N.T.S. 187.
100. See Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654 (1981) (applying a fairly loose
standard to the practice of claim settlement by executive agreement, by implying
congressional approval); United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942) (holding that the
President had the power to conduct foreign affairs without the consent of the
Senate, as he did by negotiating the Litvinov Agreement to settle liability claims
with the Soviet Union).
101. See KiM, supra note 45, at 59.
102. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention].
103. See KIM, supra note 45, at 59.
104. SIGAL, supra note 97, at 190.
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to continue to engage in dialogue with South Korea. Many South
Koreans were upset that the U.S. would establish any relationship
with North Korea, "about which nearly everyone had complex
feelings and which many regarded as a bitter enemy."1 05 The Korean
Herald voiced public fears that the Agreed Framework did not do
enough to resolve the nuclear issue, "blaring that '[t]he so-called
breakthrough... came as a glaring case of giving much and taking
Furthermore, Chosun Ilbo reported that the
little... ."' 106
"agreement symbolized a U.S. shift 'from [South Korea] to the
Korean peninsula as a whole' [and] that it proved the [U.S.], China,
1
Russia, and Japan were conspiring to prevent unification .... " 07
This alienation of South Korea certainly did not bode well for the
U.S., and it contributed to the ultimate demise of the Agreed
Framework.
Another contributing factor to the Agreed Framework's demise
was the Bush Administration's change in policies that reversed
Clinton's commitment to the nuclear threat. By putting North Korea
on the nuclear target list, the Bush Administration "reversed
Clinton's commitment against targeting non-nuclear states with
nuclear weapons." 108 North Korea warned that it would take strong
countermeasures against Bush's nuclear policy shifts, accusing the
administration of an "'inhuman plan to spark a global nuclear arms
race' and warning that it would 'not remain a passive onlooker"'
after being put on the nuclear target list.109 Under the Agreed
Framework, the U.S. had agreed to "provide formal assurances to
[North Korea], against the threat or use of nuclear weapons by the
U.S." 110 The amended U.S. policy towards North Korea probably
threatened North Korea's assurance that the U.S. would not use
nuclear weapons against it. From North Korea's perspective, the
U.S. did not follow its agreements, thus ending the "policy of
constructive engagement [that may have] successfully ended North
Korea's plans to develop nuclear weapons if the United States had

105. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 358.
106. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 176.
107. Id.
108. Robert Parry, Bush's Tough-Talkin' Korean Bungle, CONSORTIUM
10, 2006, http://www.consortiumnews.com/2006/101006.html.
109. Id.
110. Agreed Framework, supra note 6, art. 3(1).

NEWS, Oct.
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lived up to its promises" under the Agreed Framework."' Thus, the
Bush Administration's change in policy may have been the last
straw in dismantling the Agreed Framework.
2.

Six Party Talks

With the failure of the bilateral Agreed Framework, there have
been concerns about whether a multi-lateral framework could
resolve the nuclear issue.112 The Six Party Talks have dominated
discussions of the Korean peninsula's nuclear issue, but like the
Agreed Framework, have run into problems. Given the failure of
the bilateral Agreed Framework, it would appear that multilateral
negotiations would have rendered more effective results. After all,
with multiple parties participating in the denuclearization process:
[t]his variance creates a burden sharing affect [sic] where the
global powers have incentive to enforce the denuclearization
because they are sharing the cost of support that is being given to
North Korea. At the same time, North Korea is discouraged from
breaching the agreement because of the regional players'
involvement. Moreover, the careful planning and artful phrasing
of agreement builds trust and credibility among each of the
parties, supporting the verification of the agreed objectives. 113
Further, since North Korean leadership has been unpredictable and
confrontational throughout history, a flexible, multilateral approach
would be beneficial since one could not predict what North Korea
would do next.114

111. Peter Sokgu Yuh, Note, Nuclear Diplomacy: Negotiating Peace on the Korean
Peninsula, 1 LoY. INT'L L. REV. 103, 114-15 (Fall 2003/Winter 2004).
112. A professor at Dongguk University College of Law explained that "[w]hile
such a clash [between the Bush Administration and North Korea] could not be
easily reconciled, it needed to be dealt with it through a multilateral framework."
Eric Yong-Joong Lee, The Six-Party Talks and the North Korean Nuclear Dispute
Resolution Under the IAEA Safeguards Regime, 5 ASIAN-PAC. L. & POL'Y J. 3,121 (2004).
113. Jared M. Lee, Recent Development, Denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula:
Recent Agreements and Lessons from the Past, 16 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 377, 385
(Spring 2007).
114. So, with an unpredictable regime like North Korea, "which has disrespected
the NPT and other international law in the past, this less formal type of agreement
is a far better way of containing the urgent nuclear crisis .... " Ja Young Elizabeth
Kim, Note & Comment, The Agreement After the Six-Party Talks: Are There No
Alternatives to the "Modified" Version of the 1994 Geneva Agreed Framework? - An
Analysis of the Newly-Adopted Framework and its Significance for the Nuclear
Proliferation Issues Relating to North Korea, 21 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 177, 196
(Spring 2007).
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However, like the Agreed Framework, a major problem
surrounding the agreements arising from the Six Party Talks is that
they do not constitute binding treaties. If a party refused to follow
through with an agreement, international law could not intervene to
induce the party to comply.11 5 A partial explanation for the
unenforceable nature of the agreements has been that "[t]here
[was] ... pressure to get a deal done ... [and] often the easiest deal
to make is one that is vague, illusory, or lacks adequate
enforcement." u 6 The lack of a dependable enforcement mechanism
raises doubts about the progress being made to end North Korea's
nuclear program. During a congressional hearing in 2007, U.S.
Congressman Donald Manzullo acknowledged North Korea's
unreliability, questioning the lack of a verification mechanism in the
7
agreements arising out of the Six Party Talks."
The Six Party Talks continue to encounter problems with
For instance, during the
communication and coordination.
September 2005 Six Party Talks, the Bush Administration rejected a
statement of principles on nuclear disarmament during
negotiations, and it was only due to China's warning that it would
publicly announce that the U.S. was stalling progress that the U.S.
signed the statement.118 Nevertheless, the U.S. soon violated one of
the statement's main points of normalizing North Korean relations
when it sanctioned North Korean accounts in Banco Delta Asia for
the circulation of counterfeit money, which resulted in a setback in

115. Unlike a treaty, where a breach could be disciplined through international
law such as recourse to an international adjudicatory body or the U.N. Security
Council, for example, the lack of an enforcement mechanism with multilateral talks
"is a huge drawback to solving the current nuclear problem." Id. at 198.
116. The Six Party Process: Progress and Perils in North Korea's Denuclearization
Before the Subcomm. on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global Env't and the Subcomm. on
Terrorism, Nonproliferation, and Trade of the H. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 110th
Cong. 3 (2007) (statement of Brad Sherman, Congressman from California's 27th
District), available at http://www.internationalrelations.house.gov/110/38544.pdf.
Congressman Sherman noted that this was "especially true with the North Koreans,
who have a history of violating agreements and . . . a process of making an
agreement and then backing out of it, even if it is specific." Id.
117. He asked, "[H]ow do we verify that the upcoming declaration by North
Korea regarding its nuclear programs will be truthful and complete? There
currently is not verification mechanism in the agreement .. " Id. at 6.
118. Gregory Elich, Mhy Bush is Seeking Confrontation with North Korea, GLOBAL
RESEARCH,
Oct. 29, 2006, http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context =
va&aid=3619.
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negotiations. 119 Conflicts such as the Banco Delta Asia sanctions
have hampered nuclear talks.
A 2004 report to the Committee on Foreign Relations found that
the talks would probably make progress if the parties worked to
define terms and discuss verification protocols. 120 However, 2008
concluded with disputes over whether North Korea agreed to
verification protocols involving nuclear sampling as part of an
agreement to take North Korea off the list of state sponsors of
terrorism. As chief U.S. negotiator Christopher Hill stated that
North Korea would not agree to the verification proposal offered by
the other nations, thereby causing the other nations of the Six Party
Talks to reassess negotiations. 12 Given the waxing and waning
character of the Six Party Talks, perhaps a reconsideration of the
flexible, multilateral structure would improve efforts to
denuclearize the Korean peninsula.
B.

The Importance of Reunification
1.

The Status of Reunification Efforts Since the Late Twentieth
Century
An important step towards denuclearization and reconciliation
is an official end to the Korean War by replacing the armistice with a
peace treaty.
The prospects for reunification center on a
reemergence of friendly relations between the two Koreas, which

119. Although the U.S. agreed to begin normalizing relations with North Korea,
shortly after the agreement was signed it imposed sanctions on North Korean
accounts held in the Macao-based Banco Delta Asia because they were used to
circulate counterfeit currency. Id. The sanctions infuriated North Korea, giving
them a pretext to refuse to continue the talks and to increase their nuclear arsenal.
Kim Myong Chol, Speaking Freely: Sanctions on Pyongyang will Backfire, ASIA TIMES
ONLINE, Feb. 16, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/
Korea/HiB16Dg02.html.
Moreover, from North Korea's perspective, the U.S.'s actions were a "flagrant
violation" of the agreement they had just agreed to. Selig S. Harrison, In a Test, a
Reason to Talk, WASH. POST, Oct. 10, 2006, at A21, available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/article/2006/10/09/AR20061
00901035.html.
120. STAFF OF S. COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, 108TH CONG., NORTH KOREA:
STATUS REPORT ON NUCLEAR PROGRAM,

HUMANITARIAN

ISSUES,

AND ECONOMIC

REFORMS 11 (Comm. Print 2004), available at http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-

bin/ getdoc.cgi?dbname=108_cong-senate_committeeprints&docid=f:92278.pdf.
121. See Merle D. Kellerhals Jr., Six-Party Talks Stall as North Korea Refuses to Sign
Agreement, AMERICA.GOV, Dec. 11, 2008, http://www.america.gov/st/peacesecenglish/2008/December/20081211172120dmslahrellek.112652.html.
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presently are hampered by the nuclear threat. 122 However, during
the late 20th century, it appeared that North and South Korea were
progressing towards reconciliation, especially under then-President
Kim Dae Jung's Sunshine Policy, which called for promoting
economic, cultural, and social contacts with North Korea, rather
than using aggressive rhetoric and belligerent gestures. 123 While
124
North Korea initially viewed the Sunshine Policy with suspicion,
eventually at the North-South Summit in 2000, Kim Jong I1and Kim
Dae Jung worked out a joint declaration agreeing to "resolve the
question of reunification on their own initiative and through the
joint efforts of the Korean people." 125 However, many conservatives
were not comfortable with the "sudden warming and the rush of
126
developments."
Since the election of conservative President Lee Myung Bak in
2007, South Korea's relations with the North have soured.
Commentary in North Korean newspaper Rodong Sinmun accused
President Lee Myung Bak of being a "political charlatan," arguing
that his administration would be "held totally responsible for
ushering in a catastrophic incident by freezing North-South
relations and destroying peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula through its pro-U.S., anti-North Korea confrontational
attempts."1 27 In the south, South Korean newspapers warned that
North Korea's nuclear arsenal posed a threat to South Korea and
that South Korean forces were "envisaging a possible preventive
attack in case of a North Korea nuclear threat" for the first time since

122. In his inaugural speech in 2008, South Korean President Lee Myung Bak
made it clear that North Korea's denuclearization was a precondition to the
reconciliation of the two Koreas. See Jung Sung Gi, Denuclearization before NK Aid,
Feb. 25, 2008, http://www.koreatimes.co.kr/www/news/
KOREA
TIMES,
nation/2008/02/120_19564.html.
123. FEFFER, supra note 15, at 49-50.
124. From North Korea's perspective, the Sunshine Policy was an "unabashed
attempt to subvert its system, . . . designed to bring about dependent economic
relations with the South .... [This would lead to] the replacement of the present
leadership in Pyongyang with new leaders beholden to Seoul and, in time,
absorption on the South's terms." HARRISON, supra note 23, at 83.
125. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 431.
126. Id. at 434.
127. John Herskovitz, North Korea Lashes Out at South's New President, INT'L
2008,
1,
Apr.
TRIBUNE,
HERALD
OUKWD-UK-KOREAhttp://www.iht.com/articles/reuters/2008/04/01/asia/
NORTH.php.
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the end of the Korean War. 128 To exacerbate the situation, North
Korea has taken a harsher stance towards South Korea and has
threatened to obliterate it.129 Towards the end of 2008, North Korea
threatened to close its land border with South Korea in response to
South Korea's forceful approach over North Korea's nuclear
program. 130 To date, tense relations between North and South Korea
continue to hamper efforts at reconciliation and delay negotiations
to denuclearize the Korean peninsula.
2.

Reunification Resolves the Nuclear Threat

An important step towards reconciliation involves a peace
treaty. The Korean War has not officially ended, so replacing the
armistice with a peace treaty would represent a significant and
symbolic step towards peaceful reunification, and it would
contribute to efforts to denuclearize the Korean peninsula. After all,
for North Korea, replacing the armistice with a new peace structure
has been a "precondition for arms-control and confidence-building
measures." 131 Article 4 of the armistice recommended that within
three months after the armistice was signed, a "political conference
of a higher level of both sides be held by representatives appointed
respectively to settle through negotiation the questions of the
withdrawal of all foreign forces from Korea." 32 Yet, U.S. forces
have remained in South Korea well past the agreement, and the
divided countries have yet to establish peace. Over time, there have
been various efforts to replace the armistice agreement with a more
128. Lee Myung-Bak Is an Absent-Minded Traitor According to Pyongyang,
ASIANEWS,
Apr.
1,
2008,
http://www.asianews.it/index.php?l=en&art=11907&size=A.
129. Propaganda leaflets dropped into North Korea by South Korea have been
viewed as threats to the North Korean regime. North Korea has lashed out at Lee
Myung Bak for his pledge to get tough with North Korea. N. Korea Issues Warning
to South, BBC NEWS, Oct. 28, 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/7694503.stm.
Further, President Lee's hard stance towards North Korea's compliance with an
agreement to disable its nuclear complex at Yongbyon has induced North Korea to
adopt a policy of "steadily escalating confrontation." Donald Kirk, North Korea
Stokes
Another
Crisis,
ASIA
TIMES
ONLINE,
Nov.
15,
2008,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Korea/ JK15Dg01.html.
130. Kim Jung Hyun & Jon Herskovitz, North Korea Using Strongarm Nuclear
Tactics,
REUTERS,
Nov.
12,
2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/vcCandidateFeed2 /idUSSEO211167.
131. Harrison, supra note 23, at 154.
132. Korean War Armistice Agreement art. 4, July 27, 1953, available at
http://news.findlaw.com/hdocs/docs/korea/kwarmagr072753.html.
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permanent peace mechanism, but to date, the two countries have
failed to sign a peace treaty. 133
Presently, the cool relations between North and South Korea,
especially on the issue of nuclear weapons, have inhibited efforts to
achieve peace on the peninsula. However, Lee Myung Bak has
stated that he would not oppose a summit between President
Obama and Kim Jong I1if it would help end North Korea's nuclear
program.13 4 With strained relations between Pyongyang and Seoul,
reunification is probably not in the immediate future. Nonetheless,
to plan for eventual reunification, "Seoul wants the North to start
opening up and narrow gaps with the South." 135 Without peaceful
relations on the Korean peninsula, it is unlikely that North Korea
will give up its nuclear weapons program. If Kim Jong Il's relations
with the Obama Administration differ from his tumultuous
interactions with the Bush Administration, then open talks could
lead to a softening of relations among the three nations, which
would increase the prospects of a peace treaty between the two
Koreas. Thus, South Korea wants to resume talks with North Korea
and "bolster its ability to keep an eye on its communist neighbour
by working closely with the new Obama administration."136 In
doing so, the countries can work towards an official end to the
Korean War through a peace treaty, and moreover, resolve the issue

133. For example, in 1995 the South Korean Foreign Ministry had tried to devise
a "two plus two" formula where the two Koreas would negotiate a permanent
peace treaty to replace the Korean War armistice, with the U.S. and China acting as
facilitators and guarantors; however, President Kim Young Sam later stopped the
initiative. OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 383-84. Also, North Korea has wanted the
armistice commission to be replaced by a trilateral "mutual security assurance
commission" whereby North Korean, South Korean, and U.S. generals would have
equal status, but the U.S. and South Korea have refused to negotiate, their position
being that a new peace structure should be limited to North and South Korea and
occur only after tensions have decreased. Harrison, supra note 23, at 155-56.
134. S. Korea Would Be OK with Obama-Kim Jong Il Summit, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE,
Nov. 11, 2008, http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2008/11/11/asia/AS-Koreas-USNuclear.php. The article adds that Lee Myung Bak "did not have a 'speck of
concern' that a meeting between Obama and Kim would sideline South Korea in
the international effort to disarm the North of nuclear weapons." Id.
135. Moon IN Wan, Why Seoul Backs Obama on North Korea, Bus. WEEK, Nov. 18,
2008,
http://www.businessweek.com/globalbiz/content/nov2008/gb20081118245676.htm?chan=top+newstop+news+index+-+temp-global+business.
136. Jon Herskovitz & Kim Jung Hyun, S. Korea to Press North for Talks, Seeks U.S.
Help, Reuters UK, Dec. 31, 2008, http://uk.reuters.com/article/latestCrisis
/idUKSEO312559.
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of denuclearization. 137
C. A TrilateralTreatyfor the Reunification and
Denuclearizationof the Korean Peninsula
As illustrated by both the Agreed Framework and Six Party
Talks, non-binding commitments have held back developments in
the denuclearization campaign. Moreover, South Korea has been
noticeably absent from central dialogue during these agreements. 138
Given these hindrances, an international solution should respond to
the entire situation on the Korean peninsula, acknowledging the
historical context that has led to the current state of affairs, in
addition to addressing both peace and security. After all, while
diplomacy can provide for cordial relations among nations,
agreements arising out of diplomatic talks may not always result in
tangible solutions to grave threats like nuclear weapons unless the
underlying motivations for nuclear proliferation are dealt with. As
members of the U.N., North Korea, South Korea, and the U.S. have
committed to "maintain international peace and security." 139 In
order to do so, a solution requires comprehensive cooperation
among the important players in the North Korean nuclear situation.
Moreover, it requires more than a series of talks that stall when
disagreements arise. Thus, in the midst of the Six Party Talks, a
treaty that addresses and alleviates the intricate conflict among the
U.S., South Korea, and North Korea may help bring peace to the

137. Some believe that reunification will be costly to South Korea, arguing that
millions of refugees might flee the poverty and misery of North Korea for the
prosperous South and for China. See Bruce W. Bennett, Commentary: N. Korea Policy
Options, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Nov. 28, 2006, available at http://www.rand.org/
commentary/2006/11/28/UPI.html. However, the purpose of this note is not to
argue whether reunification is beneficial to the Korean peninsula, but rather, to
demonstrate that the North Korean nuclear issue is not exclusive from the issue of
potential reunification. After all, North Korea arguably will not disable its nuclear
weapons program as long as peace does not exist in East Asia. Nevertheless, fears
about the costs of reunification appear exaggerated to some commentators. See
Philip Bowring, Modeling Korean Reunification, INT'L HERALD TRIBUNE, Sept. 27, 2005,
http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/09/26/opinion/edbowring.php.
138. For example, it was China and the U.S. that initiated multi-party talks in
2003, and it was China that brought North Korea back to the multi-lateral talks
following its 2006 nuclear test. See Scott Snyder, North Korea & the Formalizationof a
Regional Security Dialogue in Northeast Asia, THE ASIA FOUNDATION, Apr. 25, 2007,
http:/ /asiafoundation.org/in-asia/ 2007/04/25/north-korea-the-formalization-ofa-regional-security-dialogue-in-northeast-asia/.
139. U.N. Charter art. 1.
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Korean peninsula and end North Korea's nuclear program, for
reasons addressed in the Vienna Convention.
A theme that casts a shadow over the Korean peninsula's
modern history shows that treaties have either been absent, or have
not succeeded, in resolving conflicts. 140 Nevertheless, a treaty has
profound advantages that may settle the question of North Korea's
nuclear regime, in addition to officially ending the Korean War. At
the outset, a treaty carries a sense of obligation that induces each
party to adhere to its provisions.
Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention asserts that treaties are "binding upon the parties to
[them] and must be performed by them in good faith." 141 The fact
that treaties are binding upon parties enhances the significance of
such agreements. According to reports, the U.S. had not treated the
Agreed Framework as a binding treaty. 142 So, while the Agreed
Framework had been viewed as an important commitment, its lack
of enforceability contributed to its downfall. Similarly, the Six Party
Talks may have stalled due to the absence of binding obligations,
which would be required in a treaty.
In addition, the Six Party Talks' delays may be the result of
confusion as to actual agreements reached during each round of
talks. At a daily briefing in December 2008, White House press
secretary Dana Perino said that "the North Koreans did not want to
put into writing what they have said in words."1 43 A treaty could
reduce confusion by virtue of the fact that treaties are "concluded
between States in written form." 144 Rather than to have a series of
agreements that may or may not have been agreed to, the treaty
provisions would dispose of confusion as to the final binding
agreement. However, the problem of interpretation remains a
potential conflict. Few will deny that the Six Party Talks have
resulted in agreements. Rather, it is the issue of interpretation of
those agreements that has halted negotiations. Still, a treaty offers

140. Among things to recall: the armistice agreement stopping the Korean War
hostilities was not considered a treaty; the Agreed Framework was viewed by the
U.S. as a non-binding political agreement; the Six Party Talk produce agreements,
but are not formally considered binding conventions; and North Korea withdrew
from the NPT, citing as a contributing factor that it felt threatened by the U.S.
141. Vienna Convention, supranote 102, art. 26.
142. See supra text accompanying note 103.
143. Kellerhals Jr., supra note 121.
144. See Vienna Convention, supra note 102, art. 2, § 1(a).
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internationally recognized norms to assist in the interpretation of
agreements, 145 which may allow for relevant international legal
principles to guide the parties, which the Six Party Talks lack
officially. The absence of a uniform guide to interpretation will
continue to hamper the multilateral talks, unless international
standards are agreed upon in order to govern disputes.
The guidance of international legal principles is particularly
helpful on the Korean peninsula. The Cold War, alleged American
imperialism, nuclear threats, security, regime survival, reunification,
and diverging Korean ideologies have all factored into the complex
relationship that has shaped international relations on the Korean
peninsula. Perhaps international law efforts to resolve the nuclear
threat and bring peace to the Korean peninsula have not succeeded
because they have failed to take into account the vast multitude of
complex issues surrounding the problem.
Not only is
denuclearization important, but an official end to the Korean War
with a peace treaty is significant. It is easy to point a finger at North
Korea for complicating efforts at denuclearization and
reunification. 146 However, one must also remember that North
Korea did not unilaterally generate the problems that preoccupy the
Korean peninsula today. 147 With the U.S. viewed by both South
Korea and North Korea as having become part of the Korean
problem as well as the Korean solution, 148 a trilateral treaty
145. See id., art. 31.
146. After all, North Korea has breached international legal obligations under
the NPT, IAEA agreement, and Joint Declaration. Additionally, Kim Jong I1 has
maintained a reputation for being difficult to negotiate with, as former Secretary of
State Condoleeza Rice explained that "[y]ou'd have to be an idiot to trust the North
Koreans." Donald Kirk, Top Diplomatic Quote of 2008 (Rice): 'You'd Have to Be an
Idiot to Trust the North Koreans,' WORLDTRIBUNE.COM, Dec. 31, 2008, http://
www.worldtribune.com/worldtribune/WTARC/2008/ea-nkorea0826_12-31.asp.
147. For example, the argument can be made that North Korea decided to
pursue a nuclear weapons program as a reactionary response to the U.S. nuclear
threat during the Cold War. Gavan McCormack emphasizes that "[w]hile in
Washington the North Korean nuclear threat has been a major issue for the past
decade, .. . in Pyongyang the U.S. nuclear threat has been the issue for the past 50
years." KiM, supra note 45, at 67. To add fuel to the fire, it does not help that the
U.S. took action such as placing North Korea on the list of state sponsors of
terrorism and imposing economic sanctions on North Korea when it had agreed to
normalize relations. John Feffer writes that "North Korea's unpredictability is cited
so frequently . . . as to become a clich& Yet the United States in the 1990s has
zigzagged sharply from war to engagement and back again .. " FEFFER, supra note
16, at 99-100.
148. KiM, supra note 45, at 54.

20101

Operation 'Denucleunification'

addressing the various issues at stake may help "denucleunify" the
peninsula and establish peace and security.
Moreover, it would be in the U.S.'s interests to form a treaty.
To begin with, a treaty is binding on all parties that sign and ratify
it, so it would erase any doubt of each party's obligations. If North
Korea's honest concerns revolve around its mistrust of the U.S.'s
commitment to its agreements, 149 then a treaty would demonstrate
that the U.S. is willing to take its international obligations seriously.
Theoretically, this should appease at least some of North Korea's
suspicions, which were partially brought on by the lack of official
treaty status of the Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks.150 Also,
given North Korea's withdrawal from the NPT, concerns about
whether North Korea would adhere to a treaty are addressed by the
Vienna Convention. If North Korea were to materially breach its
obligations, then South Korea and the U.S. could terminate the
treaty, thus releasing them from any further obligations. 151 A treaty
works for all parties, for North Korea could also terminate its treaty
obligations if the other parties materially breached. There are
foreseeable problems, such as what constitutes a material breach
and when a party can withdraw from the treaty. Nevertheless, the
essence of a treaty allows for international legal mechanisms to
guide the path towards a peaceful Korean peninsula. A treaty is just
one solution to consider in light of the problems that have plagued
the Six Party Talks.
For the two Koreas and the U.S., denuclearization is not an
issue separate from other issues. In the past, while the U.S. certainly

149. Under the Agreed Framework, the U.S. agreed to work with the
international community to provide two light water reactors as part of a deal to
dismantle North Korea's nuclear facilities. But the plan developed by KEDO was
continually delayed, and with North Korea's frustration leading it to breach the
agreement, the light water reactor project officially stopped in 2006. See KEDO,
http://www.kedo.org/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2009). Further, when North Korea
pulled out of the NPT in 2003, it indicated that it would not produce nuclear
weapons if the U.S. "[dropped] its hostile policy.., and [stopped its] nuclear threat
.... " N. Korea Says Withdrawing From Nuclear Treaty is 'Self Defense,' supra note 70.
150. It is also possible that North Korea's aims have nothing to do with
denuclearization or reconciliation, but for purposes of this note, if North Korea
sincerely wanted to normalize relations with the international community, then
U.S. compliance with a treaty would send a different message than the one North
Korea received with the stagnation of the Agreed Framework and the uncertainties
of the Six Party Talks.
151. See Vienna Convention, supranote 102, arts. 60, 70.
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hoped for North Korea to stop its nuclear program, "it also wanted a
wide range of other things... [such as] more normal relations with
North Korea to reduce the North's isolation and to set the state for a
more peaceful unification of the peninsula. 152 With North Korea
153
willing to engage in negotiations with the Obama Administration,
and South Korea having no problems with a potential North
Korean-U.S. summit,154 the three countries may be able to work
together to achieve both denuclearization and reunification.
Historically, it has been difficult for all three countries to engage in
cordial relations.1 55 Now, with a new U.S. administration, the three
countries could strive towards the creation of a treaty. Of course,
for a treaty to transpire, each country must actually consent to treaty
terms,156 which may be difficult to achieve with the high level of
distrust and uncertainty surrounding relations among the countries.
Still, it is hard to imagine denuclearization without peace on the
Korean peninsula, so inescapably, resolution of North Korea's
nuclear threat involves both South Korea and the U.S.157 However,
it would be naYve to suggest that the three countries will engage in
open and trusting relations, without acknowledging the possibility
that North Korea in fact desires reunification by force or retention of
its nuclear program. 158 Despite this concern, a trilateral treaty

152. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 191.
153. See Pro-North Korea Paper Says Obama Brings in "New Phase," REUTERS, Nov.
7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE4A621120081107.
154. See Obama-Kim Jong II Summit, supra note 134.
155. After the Agreed Framework was signed, North Korea had wanted to
negotiate a U.S.-North Korean "peace insuring system" to replace the armistice
agreement, but the U.S. did not want to negotiate a bilateral treaty without South
Korea, and North Korea refused to deal with the South Korean government.
OBERDORFER, supra note 8, at 364-65. South Korea was not a signatory to the
armistice agreement, so North Korea insisted that the South not be included in talks
about its future. Id. Also, because the South apparently "insulted North Korea by
its conduct at the death of Kim I1 Sung," North Korea refused to deal with the
South Korean government. Id.
156. See Vienna Convention, supra note 102, art. 9 (stating that the text of a treaty
is adopted "by the consent of all the parties participating in its drawing").
157. For example, the U.S. has been "central in Pyongyang's strategic thinking
and behavior, alternately seen as a mortal threat or an external life support system.
KIM, supra
....note 45, at 55.
158. Some view North Korea's intentions with pessimism. For a discussion of
possible nuclear deterrence of a nuclear North Korea and a coordinated U.S-South
Korea policy towards North Korea, see Sung Yoon Lee, Nuclear Diplomacy vis-a-vis
the DPRK: A Dead-End Street, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 151 (Summer/Fall 2003).
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among the U.S., North Korea, and South Korea is one way to
address denuclearization and reunification, and it may resolve the
conflict that has plagued international relations.
VI. Conclusion
As Michael Mazarr explains, nuclear motives can evolve over
time - what began in North Korea as a simple response to a security
threat became much more over time, as North Korea began to use its
nuclear threat as a way to gain attention from the world community
and to squeeze concessions from other countries. 159 Of course, it is
easy in hindsight to calculate what would have occurred if the
international community had reacted differently to North Korea in
the past. For example, in the 1970s, North Korea may have,
agreed to dismantle its nuclear program in exchange for securityrelated concessions such as the withdrawal of U.S. tactical nuclear
weapons from the South, an end to South Korea's nuclear
ambitions, and a U.S. pledge of nuclear nonaggression, [but by]
the early 1990s, the U.S. and South Korea offered all of those
things and barely made a dent in Pyongyang's apparent
determination to preserve some residue of its nuclear program. 160
While it is easy to pinpoint past actions, or lack thereof, it is harder
to forecast the future. Certainly, with mystery surrounding North
Korea, efforts to bring peace and security to the Korean peninsula
have not always turned out the way the international community
had hoped.
Nonetheless, the election of a new U.S. administration ushers in
a new era of hope and change, not just for Americans, but for the
international community, as well. Shortly after President Obama's
victory, a pro-Pyongyang newspaper, Choson Sinbo, stated that
"[t]he situation surrounding the Korean peninsula is about to enter
a new phase, [for a] president who calls for 'change' has emerged in
the United States." 161 Kim Seong Bae, of the Seoul-based Institute
for National Security Strategy, further highlighted, "For North
Korea, eight years of waiting is over. North Korea views Obama's
election as an opportunity to eliminate mistrust and hostile policies

159. MAZARR, supra note 17, at 182.
160. Id. at 182-83.
161. Pro-North Korea Paper Says Obama Brings in "New Phase," supra note 153.
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between the two sides."1 62 However, optimism is tempered by
caution. Some South Koreans fear that the new administration
"could make too many concession [sic] if dialogue with North Korea
goes well. Others say dialogue could encourage the North in its
strategy to communicate solely with the U.S. and freeze out the
163
South, to the detriment of Seoul-Washington relations."
The Obama administration has an opportunity to break new
ground in the discussion of denuclearization and reunification.
Although North Korea has constantly churned out rhetoric
suggesting reasons to hold up a strong shield,1 64 it is important not
to give up efforts to foster peace and bring security to the Korean
peninsula. For over half a century, North Korea has behaved in
ways that suggest that it is impossible to negotiate meaningfully
with the regime. Yet, the nuclear program has remained mostly
contained. There may be something in North Korea's recent
statement that it is "not in a position to say when [it] will abandon
nuclear weapons. That depends on when [it believes] there is no
U.S. nuclear threat." 165 Charles Pritchard reported that in October
2000, Kim Jong I1told former Secretary of State Madeline Albright
that,
in the 1970s, Deng Xiaoping, the Chinese leader, was able to
conclude that China faced no external security threat and could
accordingly refocus its resources on economic development. With
the appropriate security assurances, [Kim Jong I1]
said, he would
be able to convince his military that the [U.S.] was no longer a
threat and then be in a similar position to refocus his country's
resources. 166

162. North Korea Prepares for New U.S. President, GLOBAL SECURITY NEWSWIRE,
Nov.
7,
2008,
http://www.globalsecuritynewswire.org/gsn/nw_20081107
_1692.php.
163. Ihat Obama's Election Could Mean for Korea, CHOSUN ILBO (ENGLISH EDITION),
Nov.
6,
2008,
http://english.chosun.com/w2ldata/html/news/200811
/200811060023.html.
164. In January 2009, North Korea "accused the United States of preparing for a
pre-emptive strike by sending new fighter aircraft and spy planes to South Korea."
N. Korea Accuses U.S. of Weapons Build-Up, UNITED PRESS INT'L, Jan. 22, 2009,
http://www.upi.com/Top-News/2009/01/22/NKoreaaccusesUS-of.weapons
_build-up/UPI-38631232638998/.
165. Chris Buckley, North Korea Says Plutonium "Weaponized" and Off-limits,
REUTERS, Jan. 17, 2009, available at http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/
idUSSP37196520090118.
166. Charles L. Pritchard, A Guarantee to Bring Kim into Line, FINANCIAL TIMES,
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Since President Obama took office, his administration has taken
steps to improve relations with North Korea. On her first trip to
Asia as Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton stated that "the United
States would have a 'great openness' to [North Korea] if it gave up
its nuclear ambitions," thus presenting a softer approach towards
North Korea than the previous administration had. 167 While "North
Korea accused the [U.S.] administration of planning a nuclear attack
under the guise of diplomacy as Mrs. Clinton arrived in Seoul for
talks on restarting stalled international talks on [the nuclear
threat]," 168 it is important for the U.S. to push for collaboration with
North Korea and South Korea in realizing a nuclear-free and
peaceful Korean peninsula. Regardless of North Korea's constantly
changing rhetoric, "denucleunification" can be attained through
means of a trilateral treaty.
VI. Addendum to Operation 'Denucleunification':
A Proposal for the Reunification and Denuclearization
of the Korean Peninsula
Since the note's last edit in February 2009, North Korea has
engaged in numerous aggressive acts demonstrating its
unwillingness to participate in denuclearization or reunification
talks. On April 5, 2009, North Korea launched a long-range rocket,
drawing condemnation from the U.N. Security Council. 169 North
Korea threatened to conduct nuclear and missile tests unless the
U.N. apologized for its censure of the April rocket launch, 170 and on
May 25, 2009, North Korea reportedly conducted a nuclear test.1 71
After the test, North Korean officials stated:
Oct.
10,
2003,
available at http:/ /www.brookings.edu/opinions/2003/
1010northkoreapritchard.aspx.
167. Mark Landler, Clinton, Heading Abroad, Takes Softer Tone on North Korea, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 15, 2009, A10, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/
16/washington/16diplo.html?_r=1.
168. Christian Oliver, N. Korea Accuses US of Planning Nuclear Attack, FINANCIAL
TIMES, Feb. 19, 2009, http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/067834a6-fe4l-lldd-b19a000077b07658.html.
169. Timeline of North Korea's Nuclear and Missile Programs, THE INDEPENDENT,
May 25, 2009, available at http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/
asia/timeline-of-north-koreas-nuclear-and-missile-programs-1690533.htnl.
170. Id.
171. Choe Sang Hun, North Korea Claims to Conduct 2nd Nuclear Test, N.Y. TIMES,
May 24, 2009, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2009/05/25/world/asia/
25nuke.htnl?scp=23&sq=north%20korea&st=cse.
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The study of the policy pursued by the Obama administration for
the past [one hundred] days since its emergence made it clear that
the U.S. hostile policy toward the D.P.R.K. remains
unchanged.... There is nothing to be gained by sitting down
1 72
together with a party that continues to view us with hostility.
This rhetoric channeled North Korea's prior attitude towards U.S.
policy and diverged from its positive statements following President
Obama's election victory. 173 Moreover, North Korea "renounced the
armistice on the Korean peninsula and threatened possible attacks
on South Korea," 174 thus exacerbating the already existing tension
on the peninsula. Predictably, the U.N. Security Council sanctioned
North Korea for its antagonistic actions. 175 North Korea responded
with harsh rebuke, vowing to meet the sanctions with "retaliation"
and pledging to weaponize all the plutonium it could extract from
used fuel rods at its Yongbyon nuclear plant, which it had been
dismantling as part of an agreement arising from the Six Party
76
Talks.1
In just a matter of months, the Six Party Talks appear to have
taken a similar course as the defunct Geneva Agreed Framework.
North Korea has engaged in acts that alienate the international
177
community, including its traditional allies like China and Russia.
With the Six Party Talks stalled, the U.S. Senate called on President
Obama to contemplate returning North Korea to the State
Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism. 78 In another act of

172. Id.
173. See Pro-North Korea PaperSays Obama Brings in "New Phase," REUTERS, Nov.
7, 2008, http://www.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idUSTRE4A621120081107.
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June 14, 2009, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wpdyn/content/
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REUTERS,
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distancing, the North Korean government and Secretary of State
Hilary Clinton exchanged a war of words in July, with "Clinton
telling Pyongyang it has 'no friends' and North Korea calling her
'vulgar' and criticizing her appearance. " 179 While 2009 began with
Kim Jong I1proclaiming that North Korea would denuclearize in the
coming year, 180 it certainly does not appear that the Korean
peninsula is headed towards denuclearization or reunification soon.
Despite
the
seemingly
unattainable
objectives
of
18 1
denuclearization and reunification, the spirit of the note survives.
As the Geneva Agreed Framework and Six Party Talks have failed
to attain tangible improvements with regards to the North Korea
nuclear state of affairs, other means of action may help alleviate the
situation, such as a treaty among the U.S., North Korea, and South
Korea. North Korea has been predictably unpredictable, so it is
important to take into account the complex history leading to the
present situation on the Korean peninsula, which the note detailed,
in order to address the multilayered North Korean nuclear threat.
For example, regime survival may be one of North Korea's main
priorities, and it may view its nuclear program as one of its last
remaining bargaining chips in the international community. 182
Ensuring security guarantees or diplomatic recognition may,
ironically, lead North Korea to lessen its harsh stance against the
international community. 183 This notion goes against the general
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nuclear test in May did not come as a surprise, and "the calm reaction of Asian
stock markets, which rallied after initial falls, also suggested that [the] nuclear
detonation [in May 20091 had failed to create the shock-waves in the region that
North Korea's leader Kim Jong-il might have hoped." Peter Foster, North Korea
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2009,
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182. See Zhiqun Zhu, Commentary, Should Obama Sign a Peace Treaty with North
Korea?, THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, July 28, 2009, available at http://
www.csmonitor.com/2009/0728/p09s02-coop.html.
183. Professor Zhu believes that "[aicquiring nuclear technology does not make
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global consensus, that nations will not establish diplomatic relations
with North Korea until the regime terminates its nuclear program.
Nevertheless, the unpredictable nature of Kim Jong Ii calls for
unconventional suggestions.
However, some are wary of North Korea's tactics. The fact that
North Korea has not launched a nuclear attack against another
nation does not change the fact that it has violated numerous
agreements and treaties and that it has defied the international
community. Former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger explained,
North Korea may return to its well-established tactic of diverting
us with the prospect of imminent breakthroughs. This is exactly
what happened after the Korean nuclear weapons test in 2006.
Pyongyang undoubtedly will continue seeking to achieve de facto
acceptance as a nuclear weapons state by endlessly protracted
diplomacy. The benign atmosphere by which it culminated its
latest blackmail must not tempt us or our partners into bypaths
that confuse atmosphere with substance. 184
Rather than resorting to unsighted diplomacy, signing a treaty may
provide some legal teeth and legitimacy that the Geneva Agreed
Framework and Six Party Talks lacked. If North Korea is serious
about its desire to improve relations with South Korea and the U.S.,
then entering into a treaty would address concerns that previous
efforts to resolve the nuclear issue failed to do. In the past, there
have been several suggestions for a peace treaty - North Korea
called for a peace treaty in 2005,185 and President Bush offered a
peace treaty on the condition that North Korea provided verification
of disarmament first. 186 It is apparent that the nations are not
North Korea more dangerous; it is how the regime uses this technology that
matters. Since North Korea is already nuclear-capable, the US should keep this
traditional enemy close by signing a... peace treaty, which may be the best way to
keep North Korea's nuclear program and technology under control." Id.
184. Henry A. Kissinger, The North Korea Fallout, WASH. PoST, Aug. 9, 2009,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/08
/07/AR2009080703071.html.
185. North Korea had released a statement saying that a peace treaty would
"automatically result in the denuclearisation of the peninsula," and that "not a
single nuclear weapon [would] be needed for [North Korea] if the US nuclear threat
[was] removed." N Korea Calls for US Peace Treaty, BBC NEWS, July 22, 2005,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/ asia-pacific/4704351.stm.
186. At the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum in Sydney, President Bush
told reporters, "[Wie're looking forward to the day when we can end the Korean
War. That will happen when Kim Jong-il verifiably dismantles his weapons
programme." Bush Offers North Korea Peace Treaty if Disarms, Sept. 7, 2007,
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opposed to the idea of a treaty. Rather, it appears that the preconditions of a treaty may cause some strife. While Secretary
Kissinger is wary of the U.S. falling into a trap of empty diplomacy
with North Korea, showing some flexibility may lead to
improvements. A treaty does have legal norms to rely upon in case
a party is in material breach, so the U.S. does not have much to lose
by entering into a treaty with North Korea before North Korea
187
verifiably terminates its nuclear program.
With recent developments, including President Clinton's visit
to North Korea to secure the release of two captured American
journalists, 18 8 the international community is once again at an
important moment with regards to the North Korean nuclear issue.
North Korea has refused to return to the Six Party Talks, but it has
expressed a willingness to participate in bilateral talks with the
U.S.189 A Foreign Ministry spokesman for North Korea was quoted
as saying,
There is a specific and reserved form of dialogue that can address
the current situation.... If these countries blindly respond to the
call for the resumption of the six-party talks, contending that there
is no other alternative, it doesn't help resolve the problem; it does
more harm than good.1 90
The U.S. response has been that it is willing to hold direct talks with
North Korea if it first returns to international negotiations.1 91 White
House national security adviser James Jones stated, "[If the North
Koreans] come back to the [Six Party Talks], we will talk to them
bilaterally within those talks.... We have coordinated all of this by
the way with the other allies - the Chinese, the Russians, the South
Koreans, the Japanese." 192 Once again, all parties appear willing to
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participate in dialogue with one another. Now perhaps, the time is
ripe for a new strategy that involves a closer look at international
law. A treaty offers benefits that both the Geneva Agreed
Framework and Six Party Talks have lacked. 193 The Six Party Talks
do not appear to be progressing, and the problem of nuclear
proliferation on the Korean peninsula remains. It is unclear what
the future of negotiations holds for the Korean peninsula, as events
unfold on a daily basis and cloak the nuclear issue in ambiguity.
Still, the Obama administration, working with South Korea and the
international community, possesses the tools to break concrete
ground in the push for a nuclear-free and peaceful Korean
peninsula. This can be achieved through a treaty addressing and
resolving the complex issues that have led to present North Korean
nuclear threat.

193. See Note.

